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Abstract: 24 
As many emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases are associated with food 25 
animals, the relationship between available healthy food sources and population 26 
health and social stability has become evident. A recent example of the importance of 27 
this relationship was observed during the current flu pandemic. This recent pandemic 28 
brought attention to novel target groups of susceptible people at the interface of the 29 
animal and human populations. Veterinarians, producers and processors are uniquely 30 
exposed to emerging zoonoses. Therefore these individuals may serve as key 31 
sentinels and allow efficient evaluation of the effectiveness of zoonoses prophylaxis 32 
and control, including evaluation of the cost-effectiveness in the broader view. We 33 
also suggest some valuable approaches for rapid diagnosis of emerging and 34 
re-emerging infectious diseases and supportive systemic research which may 35 
address related ethical questions. We also highly recommend more research 36 
investigations characterizing this human/animal zoonosis interface, a potentially 37 
productive target for emerging disease diagnosis and control. 38 
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SIGNIFICANCE: 45 
In the global environment of emerging and re-emerging infectious disease, 46 
zoonoses are a potential threat to human health and economy. The current 47 
pandemic influenza outbreak was a significant public health threat that also had 48 
great impact on pork production and distribution. The workers at the interface 49 
between the animal and human populations provided evidence for their roles in 50 
establishment of disease and subsequent transmission. This interface could be 51 
a novel sentinel interface for zoonotic disease surveillance and control. 52 
Scientific funding and government policy should focus on this zoonotic 53 
interface, which could provide a novel approach to control emerging zoonotic 54 
disease. 55 
 56 
Introduction 57 
Infectious diseases, as one of leading causes of death (>25% annual total death 58 
worldwide), pose serious threats to population health, animal well being as well as 59 
food safety, economic impact and social stability (Morens et al., 2004). Economic 60 
development, public health, environmental quality and habitation quality have 61 
contributed to the prevention of infectious diseases. Even though such factors as the 62 
overall morbidity and mortality have declined slightly, there are still very serious 63 
challenges to human health that require global solutions for infectious disease 64 
prevention and control. The past few years have seen national and international 65 
disease outbreaks of significant veterinary and often zoonotic importance. This is 66 
probably the result of several trends, including exponential growth in human and 67 
livestock populations, dramatic changes in farming practices, intimate interactions 68 
between livestock and wildlife, changes in ecosystems and climate, and globalization 69 
of trade of animals and animal products (Tomley & Shirley, 2009, Chomel et al., 2007, 70 
Williams et al., 2002). As diagnostic technologies have steadily increased the ability to 71 
detect pathogens, more than 1,600 human pathogens have been defined and an 72 
average of three new infectious diseases is reported approximately every 2 years. A 73 
new infectious agent is described in the medical literature almost every week (Tomley 74 
& Shirley, 2009). It has been estimated that the majority of more than 1,400 75 
recognized human diseases are zoonotic and that more than 70 percent of 177 76 
emerging or reemerging diseases have originated from animals (Baker & Gray, 2009, 77 
Cleaveland et al., 2001, Tomley & Shirley, 2009). Zoonosis seems the major 78 
integrating theme of human and veterinary medicine. This theme of emerging and 79 
re-emerging zoonotic infectious diseases has linked world as a “global village”. This 80 
linkage indicates that no country can be free of risk in the face of an outbreak of an 81 
infectious agent anywhere on the planet. Since the first documented case of the 82 
outbreak H1N1 influenza pandemic infection in a Mexico City resident in 2009, the 83 
disease has spread to at least 208 countries with 9,596 confirmed deaths as reported 84 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) 85 
(http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/updates/en/index.html). Initial genetic 86 
characterization suggested swine as the origin of the novel H1N1 influenza virus, on 87 
the basis of sequence similarity to previously reported swine influenza isolates (Smith 88 
et al., 2009, Garten et al., 2009). However, the generation of this novel influenza 89 
involves multiple species and reflects the complexity of the human and animal 90 
interface. 91 
 92 
Lessons from Influenza 93 
The recent H1N1 pandemic influenza virus has raised many questions about how 94 
animal-origin viruses spread to human populations and evolve as emerging 95 
pathogens. From the perspective of infectious disease generation, there are three 96 
basic components of this process. Undoubtedly, close human contact with animals 97 
provides more opportunity for infection and host transfer. However, direct contact 98 
does not always result in infection. Virus persistence in the environment and host 99 
innate resistance factors also determine successful disease transmission (Boon et al., 100 
2009, Graham et al., 2008). Veterinarians, abattoir workers, farmers and others 101 
closely associated with animal husbandry, with frequent and intense exposures to 102 
pigs and poultry for example, are likely to be at elevated risk of zoonotic influenza 103 
infection. Previous data indicated that veterinarians and farmers are at risk of infection 104 
with influenza virus because of occupational exposure (Kayali et al., 2009, Gray & 105 
Kayali, 2009, Gray et al., 2008, Gray et al., 2007). Cross-species transfer infection 106 
seems an even more likely event with exposure to large numbers of concentrated 107 
animals. In most developing countries, most of the rural population of subsistence 108 
producers is involved in small-scale husbandry where livestock, poultry and even pets 109 
are housed together. However, farmers practicing small scale or free-ranging poultry 110 
and livestock production methods are at an increased risk of infection with influenza 111 
virus with a novel tropism and pathogenicity, though there are limited case reports 112 
(Graham et al., 2008). Because influenza virus contains eight RNA genomic segments, 113 
mixed infections with multiple influenza strains within a production unit may result in 114 
genetic reassortment and driving the evolution of novel influenza viruses with the 115 
potential to create emerging pandemics. While there is no direct evidence that 116 
veterinarians or swine workers played a vital role in the current novel H1N1 pandemic, 117 
inevitably, veterinarians and swine workers could potentially serve as a "bridging 118 
population" spreading pathogens to their colleagues, families, community and to 119 
those animals for which they provide care (Gray & Kayali, 2009). Such events may 120 
occur on swine operations because pigs are naturally susceptible to infection with 121 
novel type A influenza viruses. What is more, persons who work with swine could play 122 
an important role in the mixing of influenza virus strains, directing the adaptive 123 
evolution to human beings, leading to reassortment and development of novel 124 
progeny strains with pandemic and zoonotic potential (Gray & Kayali, 2009). The 125 
primary swine or poultry care givers are potentially among the first to be infected in the 126 
event of an emerging virus becoming epizootic among swine herds, and those who 127 
work with swine may serve as a bridge for transmission of the virus to their 128 
communities. Persons who work with swine could also be considered for sentinel 129 
influenza surveillance and the early diagnosis of infection could indicate a potentially 130 
emerging endemic or pandemic pathogen within the population (Gray & Kayali, 2009). 131 
However, current policies to prevent an influenza pandemic often overlook 132 
veterinarians and animal workers. Surveillance of these individuals is traditionally 133 
neglected and pathogen biology and ecology should focus on the workers at the 134 
animal-human interface. Policy measures and biosecurity procedures should be 135 
implemented to reduce hazards for veterinarians and animal workers that could 136 
prevent transmission of zoonotic diseases to others human and animal populations. 137 
 138 
Multiple Roles of “Bridging Groups” 139 
“Bridging groups” are people whom are in close contact with or have direct exposure 140 
to animals and animal products. These groups include veterinarians, farmers, and 141 
abattoir workers. A broader definition would include those individuals that could link 142 
an emerging disease from animals to the human community such as field workers, 143 
outdoor and wildlife enthusiasts, zoo keepers and pet owners. Their relationships with 144 
zoonotic disease are described in Figure 1. For influenza virus, veterinarians are just 145 
one important segment of the zoonotic disease frontier. The workers living and/or 146 
working on large scale progressive production units, people in developing countries in 147 
close proximity to their various domestic animals (usually pigs, chickens ducks, geese 148 
and water buffaloes), workers at processing facilities should all be considered as 149 
potential “bridging groups” for transmission and spread of influenza as well as other 150 
zoonotic diseases (Sahani et al., 2001). Those who have frequent exposure to wildlife 151 
are also a potential surveillance target group for emerging zoonotic diseases (Moll 152 
van Charante et al., 1998). Also, pet owners and zoo workers could be included as 153 
potential bridging groups. People who are chronically ill and possibly 154 
immunosuppressed but dependent on animals for companionship and/or for their 155 
livelihoods may also represent a unique set of bridging groups (Chomel et al., 2007, 156 
Trevejo et al., 2005).  157 
In the past research focused on either the animal or human population for zoonotic 158 
disease research, particularly with regard to diagnostics, pathogenesis and clinical 159 
prevention or management. While these populations are individually very important 160 
for disease surveillance and control the people in direct contact with the animals may 161 
better serve as sentinels for emerging infectious diseases. This concept provides an 162 
opportunity for reconsideration of the zoonotic disease frontier between humans and 163 
animals. The appreciation of pathogen ecology at the human/animal interface may 164 
facilitate recognition of emerging and reemerging disease events. Previous reports 165 
include numerous publications about occupational disease among workers n animal 166 
agriculture that focus on the chronic diseases associated with environmental factors 167 
and host atopy. There is little information regarding relative risk of contracting zoonotic 168 
disease, whether in reference to an established disease or an emerging, novel 169 
infectious disease (Hoppin et al., 2003, Radon et al., 2001). Sometimes individuals in 170 
the bridging groups may have specific immunity to pathogens and exhibit few clinical 171 
signs and may become a healthy carrier and transmitter of infection. This 172 
asymptomatic colonization and shedding could increase the potential of the carrier 173 
individual as a threat to the general public health. Therefore, surveillance of these 174 
bridging groups seems to be a promising frontier in human health and this deserves 175 
considerable attention. Because of the unpredictability of pathogen emergence, the 176 
first line of defence has to be aggressive and effective surveillance, requiring 177 
identification and monitoring of high-risk populations or individuals - the “bridging 178 
populations” seem to be the ideal target for disease identification and monitoring. 179 
 180 
Additional Suggestions for Related Research 181 
Based on these considerations, the following two major objectives have been 182 
identified as areas of possible emphasis by national authorities and scientists who are 183 
engaged in infectious disease research and surveillance. The first goal is the 184 
enhancement of available resources for disease surveillance and subsequent 185 
responses to emergencies. For known infectious agents, we need to focus on the 186 
specific agents as targets for molecular and serological surveillance within the 187 
“bridging population”. Monitoring and surveillance programs should be developed 188 
according to conditions present in individual countries or regions. For very rare and/or 189 
low risk disease situations, passive monitoring and surveillance approach of reporting 190 
of clinical suspect and confirmed cases is likely sufficient. For more common and 191 
higher risk diseases, active monitoring and surveillance along with regular, periodic 192 
collection of case reports can be applied to epidemic area (Doherr & Audige, 2001). 193 
Novel rapid, integrated assays for specific dangerous infectious agents with high 194 
throughout capability based on population requirements are urgently need. Common 195 
primers for PCR and sequencing may represent an ideal way for pathogen screening 196 
and identification as well as for epidemiological investigations. Microarray and 197 
metagenomics may also be applied to simultaneously detect multiple pathogens of 198 
interest. Epidemic early warning mechanisms and preparedness plans are also 199 
needed to complete the surveillance programs. More importantly, national authorities 200 
play a key role in devising, financing and implementing these intervention tools. 201 
The second goal is basic research in pathogen biology and the continued discovery 202 
and characterization of new infectious agents. A better understanding of the factors 203 
controlling the emergence and spread of infectious diseases is needed. The “jumping” 204 
mechanisms for cross-species infection and spreading need to be understood. 205 
Strategic research to enable targeted disease control programs which can be applied 206 
to disease control is essential. The exploration of previously unknown agents, 207 
including those agents with new host tropisms, biological phenotypes or causing new 208 
clinical presentations can provide valuable information for understanding disease 209 
transmission, pathogenesis and control. Projects such as the current Human 210 
Microbiome Project can provide tremendous information for understanding emerging 211 
diseases. These data can also be applied to disease surveillance and potential risk 212 
evaluation within target animal populations. For the “bridging group”, the 213 
metagenomic approach may be an ideal approach in the HMP for surveillance and 214 
potential risk evaluation. 215 
 216 
Questions remain and Future direction 217 
The concept of “bridging groups” represents a novel concept from Dr. Gray (Gray, et al 218 
2008). The first and greatest obstacle in utilizing these potential surveillance 219 
populations is the existing scientific limitations. Though we have evidence about 220 
zoonotic disease transmission directly from animals to humans, there are also other 221 
unknown factors that need to be understood. The second obstacle is evident in the 222 
decision-making process of disease surveillance. Though medicine has classic 223 
concepts of infectious disease control, these concepts must be considered from the 224 
perspective of the “bridging group”. The cost-effectiveness of the control programs 225 
must also be evaluated within the “bridging group”. The range and numbers of people 226 
included for regular monitoring, possible vaccination and other intervention measures 227 
in specific disease control programs must also be evaluated (Gray & Kayali, 2009, 228 
Murphy, 2008). The addition expenditures and effort associated with total disease 229 
control and surveillance may impact the human rights and ethics of the specific 230 
occupational population association with animal agriculture. Therefore this is more 231 
than a scientific problem. Surveillance of the “bridging groups” may also have direct 232 
impact on safety of animal products, which is another important route for zoonotic 233 
disease transmission. 234 
It is possible to have an even higher order of baseline preparedness through animal 235 
surveillance of a range of pathogens before they have the opportunity to infect and 236 
spread disease to humans. Initiating preventive actions by dealing with the causes 237 
and drivers of infectious diseases, particularly at the animal–human–ecosystems 238 
interface, seems also to be a promising approach. With regard to zoonosis control and 239 
prevention, integration and analysis of the surveillance data from both animal and 240 
human populations with simultaneous analysis would facilitate early warning and risk 241 
reduction. Systematic pathogen surveillance of animals and recognition of changes in 242 
pathogen prevalence, host range tropisms and pathogenesis or virulence as signals 243 
at the herd or production unit level could presage an emerging disease and possibly 244 
minimize the consequences to human and animal health. Neglected groups which are 245 
in close contact with animals due to occupational exposure need considerable more 246 
surveillance and disease prevention efforts to block an emerging zoonotic disease 247 
situation (Myers et al., 2007). These approaches seem a better choice for zoonotic 248 
disease prevention. It is highly unlikely that there will be any way to predict when or 249 
where the next important, new zoonotic pathogen will emerge; nor will there likely be 250 
any way to predict a new pathogen’s ultimate importance from its early behavior. The 251 
health and safety of the animal and human populace depends on the continuous 252 
ability to rapidly detect, monitor and control newly emerging or re-emerging livestock 253 
disease and zoonoses rapidly (Doherr & Audige, 2001). 254 
Zoonotic diseases require multidisciplinary and comprehensive research studies. 255 
Multi-sectoral collaboration and policy-oriented discussion will allow disease 256 
prevention and control. Where specific occupational exposure and close contact with 257 
animals or animal products, this discussion provides some information about how to 258 
do the supportive research and subsequent disease prevention and control on 259 
zoonotic diseases. Specific strengthening of research and testing efforts on the 260 
“bridging populations” promises a new and hopeful frontier for early warning and 261 
control of emerging zoonotic diseases. Different countries may have different levels of 262 
surveillance and control of specific diseases. Nevertheless, collaboration and 263 
cooperation will allow new surveillance and control programs to prevent the 264 
emergence of pandemic disease from the bridging populations at the interface of 265 
animals and humans. 266 
267 
 268 
 269 
Fig.1 Overview of the zoonoses front line and the “Bridging groups”. 270 
Solid arrows indicate the EID or zoonoses pathogens transmission in animals. Dotted 271 
arrows indicate the zoonoses pathogens transmission between human and animals. 272 
The figure specifically emphasizes the zoonoses transmission interface, which was 273 
defined as the “Bridging groups”. There are conclusive three major pathways for 274 
zoonoses disease contribute to “Bridging groups” at animal-human interface. 275 
Environmental pathway through wild animals and environments exposure, 276 
occupational pathway though exposure to industrial-scale livestock operation and 277 
lifestyle pathway during daytime exposure to companion animals. 278 
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